INTRODUCTION

MOST OF US ARE CONFRONTED WITH MORAL DILEM-MAS NEARLY EVERY DAY, ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY OF THESE CHOICES ARE MINOR AND OF LITTLE conse-
quence. For example, while few would experience moral angst while pondering whether it is acceptable to take an extra packet of sugar from the cafeteria at lunch to use during dinner at home later that evening, less frequent, though much weightier decisions can have life-altering consequences and can arouse considerable emotional conflict. For example, firmly held moral issues may be juxtaposed if one must decide whether it is acceptable to steal from a wealthy individual in order to feed a poor hungry child. Even greater emotional conflict may be induced if one were forced to decide whether to take an action that would severely harm or possibly kill one person in order to ultimately save the lives of many others. Because such decisions are inextricably steeped in social, emotional, religious, and moral values, their correct courses of action cannot be determined through scientific inquiry. On the other hand, it is well within the realm of science to ask how the brain goes about solving such dilemmas and what factors, whether internal or external to the individual, contribute to the judgments and decisions that are ultimately reached. For these types of questions, which address the neurobiological underpinnings of moral judgment, the field of affective/social neuroscience is beginning to provide answers.
Some of the first clues about the relationship between brain function and moral reasoning emerged from the famous case of Phineas Gage, a 19 th century railroad worker who miraculously survived a dynamite blast that projected an iron rod through his skull and the underlying prefrontal cortex, producing striking changes in his social and moral proclivities while leaving his other cognitive abilities relatively intact. 1 Computer reconstructions of the path of injury in this unusual case have shown that the iron rod passed through and ablated most of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 1 a brain region believed to be critical for the integration of emotion with cognition. Such integration of thought with feeling is believed to facilitate the ability to learn from experience and apply that learning to make advantageous decisions. [1] [2] [3] Recent evidence further suggests that this region of the brain is critical to a variety of social and emotional reasoning processes, many of which have recently been classified under the term "emotional intelligence." 4 Emotionally intelligent individuals are described as effective at monitoring their own emotions and the emotions of others, able to discriminate among subtle aspects of those emotions, and skilled at applying that information effectively to make decisions and guide behavior. 5 Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, as well as other key emotional processing structures, have been shown to have deficits on standardized tests of emotional intelligence. 4 These patients often exhibit profound impairments in social judgment and an inability to use their emotions to effectively guide decision making, despite relatively normal levels of cognitive intelligence. [1] [2] [3] Children that sustain damage to this region before the age of 16 months may never develop even the most rudimentary sense of moral values, living a life without remorse or regret for their frequent infractions of social and legal conventions. 6 In contrast, individuals that have developed normally but sustain damage to this brain region in adulthood appear to be able to reason correctly about social Study Objectives: Functional neuroimaging studies suggest a prominent role for the medial prefrontal cortex in the formation of moral judgments. Activity in this region has also been shown to decline significantly during sleep loss. We therefore examined the effects of 2 nights of sleep deprivation on several aspects of moral judgment. Design: Participants made judgments about the "appropriateness" of various courses of action in response to 3 types of moral dilemmas at rested baseline and again following 53 hours of continuous wakefulness. and moral situations, although they have difficulty applying this acquired knowledge to guide actual decision-making and behavior. 6 Modern neuroimaging techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), have confirmed the importance of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in forming moral judgments. [7] [8] [9] In a particularly compelling study, Greene and colleagues 10 used fMRI to study neural activity in the brain as participants considered a series of narratives describing dilemmas of 3 different types: 1) mundane non-moral (NM) dilemmas, 2) moral impersonal (MI) dilemmas that were low in emotional arousal and immediacy, and 3) moral personal (MP) dilemmas that were high in emotional arousal and personal immediacy. Greene and colleagues 10 found that these dilemmas differed in 2 important ways: 1) the medial prefrontal cortex (believed to be important for the ability to use feelings to guide decision making) was activated to a significantly greater extent by the MP dilemmas than either the MI or NM dilemmas, and 2) participants were significantly slower to respond when deciding to approve of solutions requiring MP violations than when disapproving of them, a difference that was not observed for MI violations. The key difference, according to Greene and colleagues, was that MP judgments produced high levels of emotional arousal relative to other forms of moral or non-moral judgments, thus activating medial prefrontal regions critical for self-relevant emotional processing.
Although the same prefrontal regions implicated in moral reasoning have also been shown to be particularly sensitive to sleep loss, showing significant reductions in glucose metabolism with as little as one night of sleep deprivation, 11 the effect of sleep loss on moral judgment processes has not yet been examined. In the present study, we therefore examined the effects of sustained wakefulness on the types of moral judgments reached and the speed with which such judgments are made. At rested baseline and again following 53.5 hours of continuous wakefulness, participants were presented with a series of scenarios that included NM, MI, and MP dilemmas. For each dilemma, a solution was proposed, and the volunteer was required to judge whether that solution was "appropriate" or "inappropriate" given the contingencies present in the situation. Based on the aforementioned brain imaging studies, it was hypothesized that sleep loss would differentially affect moral judgments that draw most heavily upon the resources of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, thus leading to a significant slowing of response times to MP dilemmas relative to MI and NM dilemmas. It was further hypothesized that sleep loss would lead to greater difficulty using emotions to form moral judgments, yielding an increase in the number of MP scenarios judged as "appropriate" when sleep deprived. Finally, since the regions hypothesized to be affected by sleep loss are also those suggested to be important for emotional intelligence, we hypothesized that the moral judgments of participants with higher scores on a test of emotional intelligence would be less affected by sleep loss than those of lower emotional intelligence.
METHODS
Subjects
Twenty-six healthy volunteers (24 right-handed; 2 left-handed by self-report) participated. The sample included 21 men and 5 women, all of whom were active duty military personnel. Participants ranged in age from 20 to 35 years (mean = 25.3, SD = 4.1), and had completed a mean of 14.1 years of education (SD = 1.6). All participants were native English speakers and all demonstrated at least an 8 th grade reading level on the Wide Range Achievement Test-3 rd Edition (WRAT-3), although the average reading grade level was significantly higher (mean = 12.4, SD = 1.6). Smokers and individuals with an average caffeine intake exceeding 300 mg per day were excluded. Volunteers were given a medical screening examination by a physician before being cleared for participation. All participants were without significant history of medical, neurological, or psychiatric problems. To ensure that the results were not affected by stimulant medications or illegal substances, all participants provided urine samples for drug screening upon initial entry into the study. Volunteers were monetarily compensated for their time. All participants were given comprehensive written and oral explanations of the study procedures and each volunteer provided written informed consent prior to participation. This study was approved by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research Human Use Review Committee and the U.S. Army Human Subjects Research Review Board.
MATERIALS
Moral Judgment Task (MJT)
The moral dilemmas used in the present study were identical to those published previously by Greene and colleagues. 10, 12 The stimuli consisted of 60 practical dilemmas that have been classified into 40 "moral" and 20 "non-moral" scenarios in earlier research. The 40 moral scenarios were further divided into "Moral Impersonal" and "Moral Personal" categories during the initial item development phase. 10 Each scenario consisted of a brief written description of a fictitious dilemma confronting the respondent and a possible solution for dealing with the dilemma. Each scenario ended with a query asking "Is it appropriate for you to… [take course of action x to achieve outcome y]." Participants made a judgment as to whether the suggested course of action was "appropriate" or "inappropriate."
In the present study, Moral Impersonal (MI) dilemmas were those that required the volunteers to judge the appropriateness of various non-personal moral violations in scenarios in which the respondent is presented with a solution to the dilemma that would benefit a larger group by merely deflecting an existing threat of serious bodily harm or death onto another individual or smaller group. In this form of dilemma, the individual performing the action does not directly or personally inflict harm on another, but the course of action described will indirectly bring about serious harm to one party through deflection of an existing threat away from another party.
Moral Personal (MP) dilemmas were similar to the MI dilemmas, except that the moral violation was of a more personal nature in that the course of action initiated by the respondent in the MP dilemmas would directly inflict serious bodily harm or death to a specific identifiable individual in order to reduce the impact of an external threat to another party. The key difference between these 2 types of dilemmas is the degree of personal involvement in producing the harmful consequences; in the MP scenarios, the actor is the "author" of the outcome and directly inflicts the harm, whereas in the MI scenarios the actor merely "edits" the inevitable harm by redirecting an already existing source of harm onto a different victim.
The 3 rd type of dilemma included in the present study involved judgments about Non-Moral (NM) decisions. In these cases, the decisions being judged did not lead to serious bodily injury to any character in the scenario. The NM scenarios simply required the volunteer to judge the appropriateness of a morally inconsequential course of action, such as choosing to take the train instead of the bus to avoid arriving late to an important meeting. The moral dilemmas were all similar in that they presented scenarios that juxtaposed clear violations of personal moral values against the immediate cost to a larger group of individuals. None of these scenarios had a correct answer. Instead, the dependent variables of interest included the response time to choose whether a given course of action was "appropriate" or "inappropriate," and whether the frequency in which the courses of action were deemed "appropriate" changed as a function of sleep loss. The actual scenarios used in the present study are identical to those in the original study by Greene and colleagues 10 and can be obtained directly from the online supporting material for the journal Science at: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/293/5537/2105/DC1.
The MJT paradigm used in the present study was modified slightly from the original stimulus program used by Greene and colleagues. For the present study, the 60 scenarios comprising the 3 types of moral dilemmas (20 MI, 20 MP, and 20 NM) were randomly divided into two 30-item alternate versions of the test (10 MI, 10 MP, and 10 NM scenarios in each version). Participants were administered these versions in a counterbalanced order, with half of the sample receiving Version A at baseline and Version B when sleep deprived, and half receiving the opposite order of administration. Stimuli were presented on a Macintosh iBook PowerPC G4 running Psyscope 1.2.5. 13 As described in greater detail elsewhere, 10, 12 each dilemma was presented in a series of 3 screens of text. The first 2 screens each presented a paragraph describing the context and details of the dilemma. The 3 rd screen posed a question about the appropriateness of an action that could be performed to respond to the dilemma. Participants were permitted to read through each screen at their own pace, pressing the space-bar to advance to the next screen. Upon completion of the 3 rd screen, participants responded to the course of action presented in the scenario by pressing one of two color coded keys labeled "appropriate" or "inappropriate." Because the original stimuli were designed for use in fMRI studies, we modified the stimulus presentations to remove the long inter-trial rest intervals between scenarios. The modified paradigm presented the stimuli as 6 blocks of 5 scenarios. Each scenario within a block was separated by a 1000 msec inter-trial interval. Each block was separated by an un-timed screen that stated "please press the space bar to continue." This screen served as a brief subject-dependent rest period to reduce fatigue-related time-on-task effects. The computer program collected data on the time required to read each of the 2 scenario description screens, the time to respond to the suggested course of action, and the actual response selection made (i.e., "appropriate" or "inappropriate").
Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i)
Also of interest was the question whether individual differences in trait emotional intelligence might moderate the effects of sleep loss on moral judgments. Therefore, the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i) 14 was administered at baseline when participants were well rested. The EQ-i is an objective self-report inventory that assesses several factors that are believed to contribute to emotional intelligence. The EQ-i provides a general measure of emotional intelligence (i.e., the capacity to understand the emotions of oneself and others, to deal effectively with interpersonal relationships, and general coping capacity), as well as a number of major factor scales and subscales. According to the test manual, the subscales show good reliability, with Cronbach's alpha ranging from 0.69 for the Social Responsibility subscale to 0.86 for the Self-Regard subscale. Test-retest reliability has been shown to range from 0.85 at one-month retesting and 0.75 following 4 months, suggesting that the scale measurements are stable across time. 14 The Bar-On model of emotional intelligence has been validated in a number of studies, shows good convergent and discriminant validity, and correlates with a broad range of emotional and personality constructs. [14] [15] [16] The Total EQ score is norm-referenced by age and sex and provides a standardized score with a population mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15 points, based on a North American normative sample of 3,831 adults. 14 In our current study sample, participants scored at the high end of the average range (Mean [SD] = 110.1 [13.2] ), with a strong negative skew to the distribution (skew = -1.8). For the present study, we classified participants into the following groups based on their Total EQ scores: average (n = 16) = 114 and below; high (n = 10) EQ = 115 and above (i.e., ≥1 SD above the population mean for age and sex).
PROCEDURE
Volunteers arrived at the sleep laboratory at 19:00 on the familiarization day (Day 0) and were briefed on the basic study procedures. After the briefing, participants were trained on several cognitive tasks in preparation for the sleep deprivation phase of the study that would begin the next morning. Beginning at 23:00, participants were given 8 hours of uninterrupted time in bed with enforced lights out until 07:00 the next morning. From 12:30 to 13:00 on Day 1, (baseline day), participants completed the first administration of the MJT. Order of administration was counterbalanced across subjects in the same experimental run (i.e., half received Version A and half received Version B). The EQ-i was administered between 17:00 and 17:30 on the same day. For the next 77 hours, participants remained awake continuously.
The present data were collected as part of a larger investigation of the effects of repeated caffeine administration on the capacity to maintain overnight vigilance performance. Consequently, approximately half of the participants (n = 12; 46.2%) were administered a 200 mg dose of caffeine, double-blind, in a chewing gum preparation 17,18 every 2 hours (at 01:00, 03:00, 05:00, and 07:00) throughout each night (total 800 mg over 8 hours).
Following 53.5 hours of wakefulness, participants completed the alternate administration of the MJT from 12:30 to 13:00 hours on Day 3. This administration time was chosen to reduce the potential residual effects of overnight caffeine (i.e., approximately one half-life since the final dose), while avoiding the possibility of withdrawal effects. When not being administered the MJT or other scheduled performance tests (reported elsewhere), participants were free to watch television or recorded movies, read, or play video-or board-games.
The goal of the present study was not to test the effectiveness of caffeine but the effects of sleep loss on moral judgments. Since the half life of caffeine approximately 4 to 6 hours for normal healthy adults, 19, 20 it was calculated that the psychostimulant ef-fects of the final overnight dose would effectively be dissipated by the time of the MJT administration on Day 3 (i.e., 5.5 hours since the last dose). However, to evaluate whether there were any residual stimulating or withdrawal effects on moral judgments, caffeine condition was initially evaluated by collapsing across all other conditions and conducting a between groups t-test on the caffeine versus placebo groups. If caffeine group was found to be significant, it was included as a factor in the omnibus analysis of variance, if not, it was excluded from further analysis. Emotional intelligence was treated in the same manner. Following each analysis of variance, significant effects and interactions were decomposed by the analysis of simple effects and post hoc comparison tests. All reported P values for post hoc tests were adjusted for multiple comparisons using a Bonferroni correction.
RESULTS
Response Time
The effects of sleep deprivation on response times (RT) for the various judgments were analyzed. Response times were tabulated separately for judgments that a course of action in a scenario was "appropriate" versus "inappropriate." The data were analyzed in 2 stages: 1) To assess the possible effects of caffeine and EQ directly, RT change scores were calculated and subjected to a separate between groups t-tests for each of the 3 types of scenarios. 2) After collapsing across caffeine and EQ groups, the data were analyzed using a 2 (baseline vs sleep deprivation) x 3 (MP, MI, NM) x 2 (response category: "appropriate" vs "inappropriate") mixed-effects analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with median response time to judge appropriateness as the dependent variable. Because it was thought that sleep loss might slow general reading speed, we attempted to statistically control for each participant's reading speed due to sleep deprivation. To accomplish this, the mean time taken to read each screen for the first 2 introductory screens of the 3 different dilemma types during the sleep deprived condition were entered as covariates within the analysis. Significant differences between means were evaluated via simple effects analysis with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons.
Caffeine Effects
Although overnight caffeine consumption was not expected to affect responses at the time of administration of the MJT (i.e., 12:30 to 13:00), the effect of caffeine on RT change scores was assessed directly. The change in median RTs from baseline to sleep deprived conditions was not significantly affected by the administration of caffeine versus placebo for any of the 3 types of scenarios (all P values > .05), regardless of whether the courses of action were deemed "appropriate" or "inappropriate." Thus, all subsequent RT analyses were collapsed across caffeine groups.
Emotional Intelligence Effects
The effect of EQ group on RT change scores for courses of action deemed "appropriate" and "inappropriate" was assessed via a series of between-groups t-tests. There was no effect of EQ group on any of the RT change scores (all P values > .05), so subsequent analyses of the RT data were collapsed across EQ groups as well.
Sleep Deprivation Effects
As hypothesized, there was a significant 3-way interaction among sleep condition (baseline vs sleep deprived) x moral judgment condition (MP, MI, NM) x response type ("appropriate" vs "inappropriate"), F 2,28 = 4.59, P = 0.019, on RT scores. To decompose this complex interaction, separate 2-way ANCOVAs were conducted for the baseline and sleep deprived conditions. On the baseline day, there was no significant interaction between moral judgment condition and response type ("appropriate" vs "inappropriate") on RTs for the scenarios, F 2,34 = 1.67, P = 0.20, so no further formal analyses were undertaken on the baseline data (see Figure 1) . In contrast, during the sleep deprived condition, there was a significant interaction between moral judgment condition and response type ("appropriate" vs "inappropriate") on the speed of responses, F 2,36 = 8.71, P = 0.001. As evident in Figure 1 , analysis of simple effects revealed that the interaction was driven primarily by a significant increase in RTs when judging the course of action for an MP dilemma as "appropriate" versus "inappropriate," following 53 hours of wakefulness, F 1,18 = 17.58, P = 0.001. In addition, RTs for judgments that a course of action was "appropriate" were significantly longer for MP than MI dilemmas (P = 0.036). In contrast, MP scenarios that were judged as "inappropriate" were made significantly faster than NM judgments also judged as "inappropriate" (P = 0.006).
Moral Judgment Decisions
We analyzed whether sleep loss affected the likelihood of judging a particular course of action as "appropriate." The number of scenarios that each participant judged as "appropriate" was tabulated for each of the 3 types of dilemmas separately. The data were analyzed in 2 stages: 1) To assess the possible effects of caffeine and EQ directly, scores reflecting the change in the number of courses of action endorsed as "appropriate" were calculated and subjected to a separate between-groups t-test for each of the 3 types of scenarios. 2) After collapsing across caffeine group, the data were analyzed using a 2 (baseline vs sleep deprivation) x 3 (MP, MI, NM) x 2 (average vs high EQ) mixed-effects analysis of variance (ANOVA). Differences between means were evaluated by simple effects analysis with Bonferroni adjustments for multiple paired comparisons.
Caffeine Effects
As in the previous analyses, the effect of caffeine versus placebo was assessed directly via between-groups t-tests for each moral judgment condition. The change in the frequency of endorsement from baseline to sleep deprived conditions was not significantly affected by the administration of caffeine versus placebo for any of the 3 types of scenarios (all P values > .05). Subsequent analyses were, therefore, collapsed across caffeine groups.
Emotional Intelligence Effects
Between group comparisons showed no difference between average and high EQ groups for the change in the number of endorsements marked "appropriate" from baseline to sleep deprived for MI or NM scenarios (P values > .05). There was, however, a significant difference between average and high EQ individuals in these change scores t 24 = 3.24, P = 0.004. Therefore, EQ category was included as a factor in the subsequent ANOVA.
Sleep Deprivation and Emotional Intelligence Effects
The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of sleep deprivation, F 1,24 = 4.45, P = 0.046, suggesting a slight increase in the willingness to endorse courses of action as "appropriate" following sleep deprivation. There was also a significant main effect of moral judgment condition, F 2,48 = 98.79, P < 0.001, although these effects occurred within the context of a 3-way interaction among sleep condition (baseline vs sleep deprivation) x moral judgment condition (MP, MI, NM) x emotional intelligence (average vs high), F 2,48 = 6.31, P = 0.004 (see Figure 2) . To further clarify the nature of the interaction, separate 2-way ANOVAs were conducted for the 3 types of moral dilemmas.
For MP dilemmas, the likelihood of judging a course of action as "appropriate" was dependent upon an interaction between sleep condition (baseline vs sleep deprived) and emotional intelligence (average vs high), F 1,24 = 10.47, P = 0.004. Analysis of simple effects revealed that for individuals of average emotional intelligence, sleep deprivation was associated with a significant increase in the number of times an MP course of action was judged "appropriate," F 1,24 = 14.81, P = 0.001, whereas, for individuals with high emotional intelligence, sleep loss had no effect on the number of MP scenarios judged as "appropriate," F 1,24 = 1.17, ns. As seen in Figure 2 , direct comparison between the 2 emotional intelligence groups revealed that there were no differences in the number of judgments classified as "appropriate" when the volunteers were well rested, but following sleep deprivation, the number of times a course of action was deemed "appropriate" was significantly higher in the average emotional intelligence group than the group classified as possessing high In contrast, for MI dilemmas, there was no interaction between sleep condition and emotional intelligence and no main effect of sleep deprivation on judgments of the appropriateness of the courses of action. There was, however, a main effect of emotional intelligence group (average vs high), F 1,24 = 6.51, P = 0.018, suggesting that volunteers classified within the average range of emotional intelligence endorsed more of the MI courses of action as "appropriate" than their counterparts in the high emotional intelligence group (Figure 2) .
For NM dilemmas, the number of courses of action deemed "appropriate" showed a slight increase from baseline to sleep deprived condition, F 1,24 = 4.49, P = 0.045, but this effect was not different for the 2 emotional intelligence groups (see Figure 2) .
DISCUSSION
We evaluated the effects of 2 nights of sleep deprivation on individual judgments about 3 types of dilemmas that varied as a function of extent of moral and emotional engagement. Our primary hypothesis, that sleep loss would selectively affect the speed and quality of moral judgments for moral personal (MP) scenarios relative to other types of dilemmas, was supported. Two days of continuous sleep deprivation produced a significant slowing of response times to moral judgments inducing high emotional conflict (MP scenarios) relative to those scenarios with lower emotional engagement (MI and NM scenarios). When tested at rested baseline, participants showed no significant differences between response times for scenarios judged as "appropriate" versus those judged as "inappropriate," regardless of the extent of morally relevant emotional engagement. In contrast, when deprived of sleep for over 53 hours, these same participants showed significantly greater difficulty judging emotionally charged MP courses of action as "appropriate" relative to judging them as "inappropriate." This slowing following sleep loss was not observed for less emotionally evocative MI and NM scenarios. These findings suggest that continuous wakefulness has a particularly debilitating effect on judgment and decision making processes that depend heavily upon the integration of emotion with cognition, processes which are believed to be mediated by regions of ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 1, 3 In previous research utilizing these same dilemmas, emotionally evocative MP scenarios differentially activated the medial prefrontal cortex relative to similar, but less emotionally arousing, MI scenarios and emotionally neutral NM scenarios. 10, 12 Since the medial prefrontal regions most activated by the MP scenarios in previous research overlap significantly with the neuroanatomical regions that show the greatest declines in metabolic activity during continuous sleep deprivation, 11, 21 it appears that continuous wakefulness may be particularly disruptive to the normal functioning of the medial prefrontal cortex. The reduction in metabolic activity within the ventromedial prefrontal cortex that results from prolonged sleep loss may degrade the normal cognitive-affective integration functions of this region, thereby making it more difficult for a sleep deprived individual to form rapid judgments that involve utilization of emotional information.
Damasio and colleagues have postulated that the ability to form good judgments and make advantageous decisions depends heavily on the ability to incorporate emotional body cues or "somatic markers" into the decision making process. 1, 3, [22] [23] [24] According to the somatic marker hypothesis, decision making is streamlined by the use of "gut level" feelings that serve to color preferences or bias decision-making toward or away from a particular course of action. These gut level feelings involve activation of bodily (i.e., "somatic") sensations associated with "good" or "bad" outcomes learned through prior experience. These somatic markers can weigh heavily in decision-making by alerting the individual via bodily sensations indicating a "bad feeling" about a particular course of action or motivating the individual toward potentially advantageous outcomes by signaling a "good feeling" about an alternative course of action. Based on lesion studies and brain imaging findings, Damasio suggests that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is the primary region of the brain where these somatic markers are integrated with cognition to influence decision making. 3 Since mood and emotional decision making are often affected by sleep deprivation, 25 we speculate that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex may be particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of sleep loss. If this speculation is supported, we would expect that sleep deprived individuals would have particular difficulty making decisions that rely heavily on emotional information, such as highly personal moral dilemmas, whereas judgments that are less emotionally engaging would be relatively unaffected. This is exactly what was observed in the present study.
It was also hypothesized that sleep loss would lead to an increase in the permissiveness or tolerance for judging difficult courses of action as appropriate, as evidenced by a greater number of MP scenarios deemed to be "appropriate" relative to the baseline state. For the sample as a whole, this was the case, with a slight trend toward a greater number of endorsements of "appropriate" following sleep loss for all scenario types. These findings were complex, however, as evidenced by the significant 3-way interaction among sleep condition, scenario type, and emotional intelligence. Emerging evidence suggests that sleep deprivation does not affect the functioning of all individuals to the same extent, since some appear to be particularly sensitive to the detrimental effects of sleep loss on cognitive functioning while others are highly resistant to such impairments. 26, 27 It has been suggested that some individuals may possess a "cognitive reserve" that permits them to sustain traditional cognitive capacities despite sleep deprivation. 28 Though speculative, we hypothesized that individuals might differ in some form of "emotional" or "affective" reserve (e.g., emotional intelligence) as well, 29 which could account for some of the differences among individuals on tasks that depend heavily upon affective processes. Therefore, in the present study, participants were assessed on a commercially available and psychometrically validated measure of "emotional intelligence" (EQ), the Bar-On EQ-i.
14 Consistent with our hypothesis, it was found that EQ was a significant moderator of the frequency of judgments in which an MP scenario was deemed "appropriate" following sleep deprivation. Participants with high EQ scores were no more likely to judge MP scenarios to be "appropriate" following 2 nights without sleep than they were at baseline. On the other hand, subjects with average or below average EQ scores were significantly more likely to judge morally difficult courses of action as "appropriate" following 2 nights without sleep. This effect was not evident for MI or NM scenarios, suggesting again that sleep loss had a significant effect only on responses to moral dilemmas that were personally and emotionally engaging. These findings suggest that individuals who begin a bout of continuous sleep deprivation with particularly well-developed emotional/social capacities are less likely to alter their judgments of emotionally charged moral situations during periods of sleep loss. In contrast, the judgments of emotionally charged moral situations by those who possess average or below average emotional/social capacities appear to be more susceptible to the effects of sleep loss.
It is important to point out that the present findings do not suggest that sleep deprivation leads to a decline in "morality" or in the quality of moral beliefs. We simply evaluated the latency to respond and the change in the leniency or permissiveness of response style as evidenced by the tendency to decide that particular courses of action were "appropriate" before and after sleep loss. Whether these judgments were morally "right" or "wrong" in any absolute sense was not addressed. Instead, our results simply suggest that when sleep deprived, individuals appear to be selectively slower in their deliberations about MP dilemmas relative to other types of dilemmas. Further, our results suggest that the judgments of individuals with high scores on a test of emotional intelligence were less likely to change to a more permissive moral stance following sleep loss-i.e., their judgments remained more stable and unwavering in when confronted with emotionally charged dilemmas when sleep deprived, relative to those with average or lower emotional intelligence.
The present findings may have implications for those in occupations that frequently require periods of extended sleep loss and in which real-world moral dilemmas may be encountered (e.g., emergency medical services, military personnel in combat, fire/ rescue workers). When sleep deprived, such personnel may experience greater difficulty reaching morally based decisions under emotionally evocative circumstances and may be prone to choosing courses of action that differ from those that they would have chosen in a fully rested state.
The finding that individuals high in emotional intelligence were more stable in their moral judgments following sleep loss raises the possibility that this trait may be an important characteristic in selecting individuals to operate under such extreme conditions. Although the construct of emotional intelligence continues to be debated, 30 there is some evidence to suggest that some facets of this capacity can be developed through training programs 31 and that such training may be most effective during the childhood years from preschool through adolescence. 32 If the skills encompassed by the construct of emotional intelligence are effective at sustaining morally relevant judgments under the stresses of sleep deprivation, it may prove worthwhile to evaluate the effectiveness of emotional skill development programs for populations needing to maintain judgment capacities during sustained operations.
Although the goal of the present report was to examine the effect of continuous sleep loss on moral judgment, this was a part of a larger study of the effects of repeated overnight caffeine administration on psychomotor vigilance. The moral judgment test was administered 5.5 hours after the last dose of caffeine, so it is possible that there were subtle differences between those receiving caffeine versus placebo during the previous nighttime hours. Since the half-life of caffeine is 4 to 6 hours for normal, healthy adults 19, 20 and the alerting effects have been found to have effectively dissipated by the time of current test administration (in a similar multiple dose study using the same caffeine dose regimen), 17, 18 it was anticipated that the residual effects of the last overnight dose of caffeine would be minimal by the time participants were administered the MJT. We directly assessed the effect of caffeine on all of the dependent variables and found no significant effects in any analysis. Therefore, we are confident that the sleep loss findings we observed were not meaningfully influenced by the residual effects of caffeine. The failure to find caffeine effects in this analysis is consistent with recent evidence demonstrating that while caffeine is effective at restoring and sustaining simple cognitive processes such as alertness and vigilance, it appears to have limited effects at restoring some higher order complex cognitive processes. 33 Although the present findings suggest that sleep loss is associated specifically with degradation of the speed of responding and alteration of the qualitative outcome of moral judgments involving highly emotional and personally relevant situations, these data must be interpreted in light of several methodological limitations. First, our sample only included 26 volunteers, which was large enough to reveal a significant effect of sleep loss on response times and "appropriateness" judgments for MP scenarios, but may have obscured more subtle effects on MI and NM scenarios. The present sample was also quite homogeneous, comprising only active duty military participants from the United States. Such participants are likely to share a common set of values, moral beliefs, and common training experiences that may have contributed to the pattern of findings. Military personnel are routinely exposed to difficult training scenarios that require them to consider the moral implications and congruence of their actions with an explicit code of values. Furthermore, all of the present participants voluntarily made the decision to join or remain in the U.S. military during a time of wartime conflict. Consequently, the responses of our sample are likely to be unique to that culture and may not be representative of nonmilitary personnel.
The present study was also limited by the use of only single assessment measures of moral judgment and emotional intelligence. The use of single measures of psychological constructs can restrict the generalizability of the findings, and may constitute a threat to validity if these measures later prove to inadequately reflect the hypothetical construct of interest. The MJT, however, has been used in previous research 10, 12, 34 and has been shown to result in activation of similar brain regions as other putative tests of moral reasoning. 8, 9, 35, 36 Similarly, the test selected for assessing emotional intelligence has been shown to be psychometrically reliable and valid, [14] [15] [16] and is currently among the most widely used, commercially available tests of this construct. Nevertheless, the hypothetical construct of emotional intelligence is still a matter of some debate. 5, 30 Further studies to determine the extent to which the present findings generalize to other measures of emotional intelligence and moral judgment will be needed to firmly establish the effects of sleep loss on these capacities.
In conclusion, the present findings suggest that 2 nights of continuous sleep loss selectively affects responses to moral dilemmas that are highly emotionally engaging due to their requirements for personal proximity and direct action by the individual. The effects of sleep loss on some aspects of moral judgments may be moderated by individual differences in emotional intelligence. These findings provide further support to the hypothesis that sleep loss is particularly disruptive to the ventromedial prefrontal regions of the brain, which are important for the integration of affect and cognition in the service of judgment and decision making.
